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The following paper is a response to Axel Gosseries’s “Nations, Generations and 
Climate Justice.” The core argument in Gosseries’s sharp and challenging text states 
that (1) we can understand intergenerational justice as transit duties between coun-
tries; that (2) impartial global planners should realize these duties through an inter-
generational global leximin principle; and (3) that the right implementation of this 
principle implies strictly equivalent intergenerational transfers.
In this text I will address the evaluative perspective of the impartial global planner 
and its institutional interpretation; then I will briefly present an “opportunistic” 
reply to the vagueness objection to rectificatory justice; finally I briefly examine the 
development of the right of transit in the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea and 
the limits to its intergenerational extension.
Axel Gosseries’s paper presents a series of challenges that reflect the intrin-
sic nature of the problems it addresses. This commentary points to some 
possible vagueness and opens the way to further development of such a 
concise piece of philosophical work.
* Post-Doctoral FCT researcher at CEHUM- Minho University; Instituto de Letras e Ciências 
Humanas, Universidade do Minho; Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga. 
 This research has also been facilitated by an extended leave from the University of Vigo.
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1. Impartial Perspective and Institutions: Imagine there’s no 
country.
Gosseries’s affirms that his work assumes an “impartialist” evaluative per-
spective, and a Rawlsian framework of reference to discuss the “just savings” 
duty and the duty of international assistance. By impartialist perspective 
one infers that the reader is expected to identify herself with the point of 
view of an impartial global planner, bracketing her domestic allegiances 
and partial commitments. However, it is not always clear whether we are 
assessing the problems under a cosmopolitan or international veil of igno-
rance. We do not always know if these are recommendations for a world 
state or for an international system. 
 If impartial consideration of the interests of humanity takes precedence 
then allegiance to national projects is in need of justification.  Partiality 
might then be (1) tolerated as a factual limitation (humans are just unable 
to be proper cosmopolitans); it might be a (2) permissible alternative (if 
all things considered, a civilized internationalism brings about outcomes 
equivalent to those of an institutional cosmopolitanism); it might have a (3) 
functional justification (national allegiance works as a motivational incen-
tive that leximins global welfare); or national allegiance might have an (4) 
independent justification. In this last case, it might be contemplated as an 
independent source of rival values that take (4.1.) lexicographic priority 
over and constrains the shape of a global leximin redistribution. Or shared 
political membership may be conceived as the (4.2.) proper site of distribu-
tive justice, ruling out cosmopolitanism in favor of humanitarian assistance.
If our institutional landscape is an international system of territorial 
states, should a single nation embrace these impartialist conclusions regard-
less what the others do? Should they instead advance through common 
institutions in concerted cosmopolitan reform? Gosseries’ text is focused 
on the obligations of justice and it would be unfair to expect a whole treatise 
that deals also with all the questions of institutional translation. My main 
remark is just to point that our prima facie agreements about abstract issues 
like intergenerational justice could later dissolve once we make explicit the 
institutional structure where the principles are embedded. Even if they 
seem prima facie plausible and convincing they could end up subordinated 
to other conflicting considerations. Political structures are not just empty 
vehicles but they are constituted themselves by diverse hierarchies of val-
ues and principles. This is not being denied at any point in the article. It 
is just left outside of the main discussion. The main problem comes with 
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the indeterminacy in the opening line, where we are invited to take the 
perspective of a “global policy-maker.” If our global planer was sitting as 
a party at the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change she may come 
with the right principles around which all parties should be of one mind. 
This is an outstanding theoretical task of its own. Unfortunately, most of the 
intergenerational problems are typically also problems of collective action 
about global commons and limited resources. At this level it is inescapable 
that there are several particular minds with very particular priorities. How 
would a cosmopolitan impartialist bridge this gap? Does it matter whether 
we are talking about the foreign policy of a democratic republic, ethical 
principles for the international community or cosmopolitan principles of 
justice for a global federation?
Gosseries’ essay is admirable because it does not address the question 
of Climate Justice in isolation but in tandem with the current global distrib-
utive obligations.  But if the conclusion is that we have strong inter and intra 
generational obligations of justice that our political structures consistently 
avoid then the next stop would be to address the conflict between the values 
and principles that our international system expresses and other plausible 
alternative institutional scenarios. This would be a much desired follow up 
for a theory that aspires to guide the decisions of “global policy-makers.”
1.1. A Realistic Intergenerational Utopia.
Rawls’s proposal of a realistic utopia for the international order defends 
that the principles for an international society of decent peoples could be 
arrived at, independently and coincidently, both form a national (liberal-
democratic) point of view and from an international overlapping consen-
sus. However, cosmopolitan critics claim that this reconciliatory strategy 
legitimizes and reproduces unacceptable levels of international inequality 
that are at odds with his general conception of domestic social justice.
The Rawlsian framework is a problematic reference for examining 
intergenerational justice from a cosmopolitan perspective. When consider-
ing the “just savings” principle Rawls introduced “care for the descendants” 
as a “partialist” motivational force to overcome indifference between gen-
erations when real savings are required (Rawls, 1999a: 160 n.39). Similarly, 
Rawls makes peoples responsible owners of their territories in perpetuity 
in order to motivate environmental sustainability over time (Rawls, 1999b: 
8-9, 38-39). Care for the offspring and concern about one’s land are two 
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functional and partialist motivational forces. Rawls held the Kantian hope 
that the principles of the Law of Peoples would be eventually internalized 
and upheld by the different national constituencies (Rawls, 1999b: 112-
113). However, this aspirational belief aims at the spontaneous realization 
of his sufficientarian international benchmark and not at the progressive 
institutionalization of more demanding cosmopolitan terms (Rawls 1999b: 
106-107).
In contrast, Gosseries’s text assumes that Portuguese citizens should 
reconsider their deep attachment to the Alentejo’s environment on global 
impartial grounds. Similarly, Portuguese “just savings” should go to those 
most unfortunate worldwide, irrespective of what the rest of the nations 
do. Lacking a background cosmopolitan order, unilateral sacrifices come 
at a larger cost. On the one hand, co-nationals may feel that they are being 
left-behind in terms of relative disadvantage or forgone opportunities, 
and that they are suffering the consequences of generalized international 
indifference. On the other hand, the compensatory international solidarity 
embraced by the Portuguese government would imply a relative interna-
tional disadvantage in terms of welfare, market or political influence. This 
principled impartialist commitment has an impact on the values and social 
cohesion that support the Portuguese national project. In the following 
lines I sketch some alternative ways to accommodate national allegiances 
and impartial commitments.
An impartialist agent acting in an uncoordinated competitive environ-
ment of generalized non-compliance has to face that if “doing one’s share” 
is determined only by the situation of the recipient then it may imply a 
disproportional sacrifice for the complying few that do not discriminate 
between domestic and foreign poor (altruist). Alternatively, if we under-
stand “impartiality” as the principle that determines the distribution of 
duties and benefits at the level of an ideal benchmark of perfect compliance, 
then we may understand that while the allocation is “impartial,” all agents 
may exercise permissible partiality in scenarios of  imperfect compliance 
(Murphy, 2000). Accordingly, one may just “do one’s share” (reducing emis-
sions) even if this is globally insufficient (rigorist). Or this agent might even 
be allowed to fail if “doing one’s share” entails some unilateral dispropor-
tionate disadvantage before rival competitors (realist).                                     
Finally, we can conceive some (pragmatic) reconciliation. In an inter-
national system of limited compliance and non-altruistic national con-
stituencies a global rank-constrained leximin could work as a practical 
compromise. Following this rule, we can stipulate that the national quota of 
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transfers should not modify the global ranking of national GDPs and must 
be allocated through a leximin ordering. However, this partialist compro-
mise is far from ideal from a cosmopolitan perspective, as it legitimizes the 
current distributive benchmark and the particular entitlements it supports. 
1.2. Assisting to Save: The Global Piggy-Bank.
An additional source of ambiguity concerns the institutional division of 
labor between domestic savings and international assistance. This problem 
is also inherited from the Rawlsian framework. 
“Accumulation phase” and “steady state stage” they both refer to the 
efforts that burdened societies make to achieve a sufficient level of political 
self-determination. Gosseries discusses the problem of justifying a tempo-
rary investment that partially sacrifices the lot of the worst-off in the gen-
erations below the target stage. As the time arrow only flies forward, the 
beneficiary generation faces also the impossibility of reciprocating for the 
legacy. However, this problem is framed in the terms of national peoples 
and their duties towards the future nationals. 
If we step back from the domestic picture then we have to face that 
the real transfer to a burdened society has to come from the richest coun-
tries in virtue of an intragenerational global leximin or via an international 
duty of assistance. Whatever saving duty that burdens a society below this 
threshold cannot be “just” and, consequently, it should be covered by the 
international duty of assistance. 
According to Gosseries, a proper understanding of an intergenerational 
leximin leads to a “principle of strict equivalence.” This implies that nations 
in a steady state stage should not save and transfer to the next generation 
more than what they received from the previous one –because that would 
be at the expense of the currently worst-off; but they should neither reduce 
(dis-save) the lot they inherited –and make the next generation worse-off. 
This makes sense because Gosseries’s impartial perspective minimizes the 
significance of spatial or temporal jurisdictions. If geography and history 
are morally arbitrary factors then the world behaves like a unified distribu-
tive system in which generations are time-slices of a fixed population size 
(let’s keep the serious demographic problem out of the equation).
Under Gosseries’s leximin, every “surplus” belongs to the currently 
worst-off while every improvement in today’s threshold should be trans-
ferred in equivalent terms to the next generation. Every international 
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transfer increases the intergenerational debt of the recipient state (“just 
savings”). Consequently, every penny earmarked for the worst-off should 
be also split with the intergenerational piggy-bank. Gosseries is right when 
he points to the necessity of conceiving intergenerational and global justice 
in an interconnected way. 
In fact, this leximin approach makes a pretty strong case for a global 
institutional reform. If the case for strong interconnected duties of inter 
and intra generational global justice is sound, then the burden of proof 
rests on those that defend an institutional design in which these duties 
are freely and discretionally observed or arbitrarily avoided. If the global 
argument is convincing then the institution that embeds this global lexi-
min principle should be perceived with the legitimacy to determine one’s 
contribution and the authority to collect it. Why not a global tax authority? 
A single centralized account could establish the saving rates, investments 
and borrowing conditions. It could also establish premiums and liabilities 
if responsibility applies. However, such a leximin piggy-bank presupposes 
a substantive degree of political integration along the international-cosmo-
politan continuum, and that kind of integration may be justified as a global 
and intergenerational duty.
2. Rectificatory Hook and Opportunistic Nets.
Gosseries’s main objection to rectificatory arguments in climate change 
justice is that these claims are parasitic on the recognition of a prior dis-
tributive theory. It is this theory that grounds the arguments and defines the 
compensation after unjustified diversions from the right course of action. 
Lacking that prior criterion of justice, today’s attempts at rectification imply 
retroactive imputations to agents that lacked full knowledge of the conse-
quences of their actions at that time (industrialization period), and pun-
ishes their descendants for this lack of prescience.
Regarding the robustness objection of the rectificatory claims, we can 
agree on this point while resisting the temptation of throwing the baby with 
the dirty water. 
In the non-ideal conditions of our shared history we can presume that 
much of the industrialization effort has been made through forced and 
unconsented colonial exploitation and resource exhaustion. Some other 
“voluntary” transactions” were made under conditions of duress and in 
many other circumstances through an abusive and disproportionate bar-
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gaining power. Even in these cases, transactions were often made through 
non-representative leaders. In some other cases, voluntary transactions 
took place with peoples that were not aware of how the transfer of these 
raw resources to foreign powers would exponentially exacerbate their own 
dependency. 
These arguments also cast a doubt on the robustness and legitimacy 
of the prima facie voluntary market transactions in the historical path of 
development and industrialization. We can acknowledge the lack of a pat-
terned distributive principle that regulates historical emissions. But we can 
recognize the presence of a robust historical pattern that partially under-
mines the claims to the full entitlement of the benefits of (non-patterned 
principles of) voluntary transactions.
Regarding the lack of awareness objection, we are familiar with situa-
tions where strict liability applies. It is commonly assumed even for totally 
accidental damages or to foreigners that act in good faith but ignoring the 
local laws. There are social efficiency considerations that justify these meas-
ures. Even if I am not morally responsible for passing out while driving I 
may still be accountable for the damages. In our case, presuming that CO2 
emissions imposed negligible externalities was a false belief with global 
negative consequences that are mostly borne by the most vulnerable devel-
oping nations. Ignorance was bliss, but current generations in developed 
countries inherited the material “benefits of the doubt.” On the full legiti-
macy of this entitlement I would cast a doubt. The historical case for plausi-
ble deniability may put current generations out of the moral hook but they 
are still in the accountability net.
In the default case of negative externalities attached to of prima facie 
voluntary transactions we do not have any criterion for background jus-
tice other than free agreement. However, if we presume that this history 
of disproportionate accumulation of benefits on one side leads to a inher-
ited situation of disproportionate economic capacity, then the rectificatory 
argument may undermine the presumption to the full entitlement over 
the assets that the most developed nations command. Even if we cannot 
exact the amount of the compensation, the rectificatory claim may back an 
argument for a contributive duty based on a capacity claim. Consequently, 
developed nations should join the battle against climate change in more 
“generous” terms than the rest. This interpretation just backs Gosseries’s 
arguments for an “opportunistic” take on climate change justice.
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3. The Jeffersonian conception: transit duties, enabling 
access and opportunity costs. 
An account of intergenerational duties might get inspiration from how 
international law would handle a sea-less world in which all countries were 
land-locked. All generations are both period-locked and transit generation. 
(Gosseries, in this volume)
This idea, loosely borrowed from Thomas Jefferson, is perhaps the most 
original contribution to broaden our minds and explore our intuitions 
about intergenerational duties. Gosseries exploits the image of a world of 
land-locked territorial nations and the consequent duties of transit to third 
states as a powerful analogue to capture our moral imagination and model 
our transit duties towards future generations. Intergenerational legacy is 
the equivalent to international transit.
The conclusion that we arrive at is that there is a strong duty of jus-
tice towards future generations. Our succeeding generations depend on us 
like landlocked recipient nations depend on neighbouring transit states. If 
international law recognizes this ius gentium between neighbouring peo-
ples then there is an analogous case to extend our institutional responsibili-
ties to future peoples. 
For the argument’s sake, I will assume that transit rights impose unilat-
eral obligations that are independent of any reciprocal interest between the 
intermediary and recipient states. I will also bracket the identity problems 
applied to peoples considered as historical collective subjects with variable 
composition and demographic size. Instead, I will assume that institutional 
continuity amounts to a persistent collective identity. 
Gosseries’s metaphor draws its rhetorical persuasion from the recon-
struction of territorial transit as historical transmission. Conserving 
resources through time is like shipping them through space. Both ship-
ments travel the dimensions and reach their targeted recipient. In both 
cases the transit peoples have a duty to allow the flow. In the territorial case 
it amounts to give access permits, refrain from imposing abusive taxes or 
burdensome bureaucratic procedures. These obligations can be read mostly 
in terms of negative duties, although they are grounded on an implicit rec-
ognition of a right to development on behalf of the landlocked recipient 
people. The “duty to allow” transit implies a negative duty of non-interfer-
ence, understood as a unilateral principled restraint on the transit state’s 
sovereign powers. Similarly, the duty to “preserve a legacy” can be read as a 
demand of non-interference that implies the positive obligation to keep the 
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resource intact. In this case the analogous sovereign restraint applies to the 
inherited resources. 
If this analogy is to hold, we should deal with the disanalogy between 
succession and continuity. Succeeding generations are natural heirs of the 
national legacy as future selves of the same subject. Territorial transit states 
are not successors of the sender people. They are mere intermediaries and 
they do not inherit ownership of the shipment. However, we could say that 
their physical continuity as neighbours makes them depositaries of a duty 
of stewardship over the goods in transit.  For this strategy to work, we have 
to assimilate one service (territorial access and transit dispositions) to an 
inherited good (material and immaterial legacy). The main difference is 
that in the first case, the territorial service implies a negligible burden while 
in the intergenerational case conservation may amount to a substantive 
opportunity cost for the transit generation.  Although fungible or liquid 
assets may be replaced in a sustainable way, conservation always implies 
a sacrifice for the present generation. Here, the analogy with the interna-
tional codification of the right of transit is the figure that helps us accept the 
opportunity costs implied in this intergenerational transmission of a legacy 
under a more favourable look.
Despite of the persuasiveness of the analogy I would like to introduce 
an empirical sceptical note regarding the role of the international conven-
tion on the matter.  The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is the result 
of a protracted deliberation between developed and developing countries. 
The cause of the decade long discussion was precisely strong interest of the 
developed countries to drive a wedge between those measures that could be 
mutually beneficial or not burdensome cooperation and those that could 
imply an opportunity cost for their technological advantage. 
The right of access for landlocked countries was generally accepted in 
the Law of the Sea, along with very advanced cosmopolitan and impartial 
considerations in the case of “geographically disadvantaged countries,” or 
prioritarian considerations in favour of landlocked developing countries 
for access to fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone of neighbouring 
countries (UNCLOS, Art.125).
1. Land-locked States shall have the right of access to and from the 
sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for in this 
Convention including those relating to the freedom of the high 
seas and the common heritage of mankind. To this end, land-
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locked States shall enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of 
transit States by all means of transport.
2. The terms and modalities for exercising freedom of transit shall be 
agreed between the land-locked States and transit States concerned 
through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements.
3. Transit States, in the exercise of their full sovereignty over their ter-
ritory, shall have the right to take all measures necessary to ensure 
that the rights and facilities provided for in this Part for land-
locked States shall in no way infringe their legitimate interests.
Developed countries were also crucially benefiting from the codifica-
tion of the international right of innocent passage through foreign waters 
and strategic straits under alien control (Tanaka, 2012: ch. 12). However, 
the divisive issue in these negotiations was the access to the international 
oceanic floor and the foreseeable exploitation of the rich mineral resources 
in the deep seabed. Only few industrialised nations have the technological 
capacity that allows access to the ocean floor but even for these few, exploi-
tation is not yet cost-beneficial. The developing countries were interested in 
turn in preserving the common resource until all parties could have equi-
table conditions of access or adequate compensation for the consumption 
(Garrison, 2007).
The original proposal drafted by Arvid Parvo introduced the intergen-
erational and cosmopolitan principle of Common Heritage of Mankind to 
preserve and exploit the resources in the international common area for the 
benefit of whole human population, present and future. It contemplates some 
redistributive mechanisms and the duty to share the access technology.
The widespread conventions about the right to access and innocent 
passage presuppose that peoples depend on these strategic conditions for 
their development and that neighbours have a duty to facilitate it. However, 
regarding the common oceanic resources, developed nations wanted a reg-
ulation that reflected their preferential conditions of access and exploita-
tion while minimizing their contribution for developing and future peoples 
alike. 
Allowing freedom of transit and enabling access through shared knowl-
edge are conceptually similar but entail different implications. Transit rights 
are recognized because they imply a negligible burden on the transit state. 
Scientific knowledge and technological know-how are considered public 
goods because ideas are immaterial assets that can be shared infinitely at 
the same quality of enjoyment (non-rivalrous). However, sharing access 
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conditions to the common implies a substantial opportunity cost for those 
holding the technological edge. 
The final formula for the exploitation of the mineral resources in the 
common area eventually accommodated the relative advantage of devel-
oped countries by eliminating the duty to transfer their non-material pub-
lic-good resources for access (technology & knowledge) as a condition to 
share in the common resources of humankind. The agreement also lifted 
access barriers, incorporated pro-market approaches and facilitated condi-
tions for private enterprises. It also relaxed the parties’ quota in the contri-
bution for management, sustainability and development. 
Although the International Law of the Sea was negotiated as a whole 
package, its procedural history shows that the pro-development attitude 
shared in regard to the right of transit was not extended to the conditions 
of access to the common resources of humankind. The particularist interest 
of developed nations trumped the impartialist extension of the metaphor of 
the “right of transit” to the common pool of resources.
Gosseries’ heuristic strategy depended on the assimilation between 
access duties through space and time to defend a proposal of inter and intra-
generational justice. After analyzing the trends behind the deliberations 
around the Law of the Sea one might question whether Gosseries’ strategy is 
limited by a territorial and historical identity problem. The negotiations in 
international law suggest that the initial appeal of the Jeffersonian intergen-
erational model might rests on the assumption that the transferred legacy is 
earmarked for the succeeding generations of a particular people instead of 
conceived as a contribution to the common heritage of humankind.
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